Finland 2026
20/01/2026: The Kurdish armed group Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which governed the autonomous region of Rojava located in Northeastern Syria, withdrew from the al-Hol camp where thousands of IS family members were detained. Kurdish groups fought with Damas forces advancing into Rojava to forcefully reintegrate the region into the Syrian State. Syrian Government forces accused SDF guards of abandoning the camp thus allowing the detainees to escape and pose a new security threat by joining IS. A dozen of Finnish prisonners, mostly mothers and their children, were still detained in the camp. Despite Syrian Government forces to take control of the camp in order to prevent any escape, local situation is still unclear. According to Ilhan Ahmed, who is responsible for Rojava's foreign relations, the Kurds have no information about the situation of the Finns or other foreigners who were in al-Hol. (Source)
30/01/2026: Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs warns that the planned transfer of up to 7,000 IS-linked prisoners from Northeastern Syria to Iraq will affect European and Finnish security. Since Damas is now attempting to forcefully reclaim the region, security prospectives are now uncertain. According to Jussi Tanner, Head of Consular Affairs, the collapse of Kurdish control over detention centers marks a major turning point. Although Finland is not aware of any Finnish citizens among those transferred, authorities cannot be fully certain due to incomplete identification data. It is implied that Finnish detainees may have been eliminated in the clashes between Kurdish and Damas forces, but no conclusive evidence may support such assertion. From Finland’s perspective, the situation is especially problematic because detainees will switch from the custody of a non-State Kurdish administration to the legal jurisdiction of Iraq, a sovereign State that implements the death penalty. If Finnish nationals were involved, Finland would be legally required to intervene, creating serious legal and diplomatic challenges. Concerns are heightened by Iraq’s record of mass convictions and executions following trials criticized for failing to meet international standards. Tanner stresses that security risks extend beyond geography: extremist ideologies can spread across borders, including to Finland, through online networks and radicalization. Finland continues to monitor the fate of remaining detention camps, including al-Hol, where about a dozen Finns, mother and children were detained according to last data. While some children have been repatriated in the past, Finland does not consider itself obligated to return adult fighters. Finnish authorities are maintaining close contact with Syrian, Iraqi, and Kurdish actors but acknowledge that the situation is largely outside Finland’s control. The Government is preparing for potential security impacts in the coming weeks. (Source)
04/02/2026: The Syrian Government reportedly plans to close the al-Hol and Roj camps in Northeastern Syria, though no official confirmation has been issued, and the future of the camps’ 28,000 inhabitants, around 8,000 of whom are foreigners, remains uncertain. The camps have long suffered from overcrowding, inadequate administration, and daily violence, including the presence of active IS cells. The UN recently assumed administrative responsibilities in al-Hol, highlighting ongoing challenges in registration, security, and humanitarian provision. Among the foreign nationals are a small number of Finnish citizens, mostly minors. Jussi Tanner, Head of Consular Affairs at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, noted that Finland has received no notification from Syria but would ensure safe and controlled repatriation if required. Tanner also observed that many remaining Finns represent “the most difficult cases”, having previously declined any possibility to return. This is reminiscent of "Jonna", a Finnish woman who settled in IS so-called Caliphate back in 2015 and refused to be repatriated to Finland as she expressed hopes that IS will rise again in the region when she was interviewed in 2019. Although she and her children were allegedly still alive, their whereabouts are currently unknown since the clashes that recently occured between Kurdish and Damas forces around the camps.
Finnish Supo warned about the threat posed by returnees as soon as 2019, noting that those who stayed longer in the conflict zone may be more ideologically committed. This assessment remains unchanged. To date, 26 children, nine women, and one man have returned to Finland. Preliminary investigations were reportedly ongoing in March 2025, but no charges have been filed. Experts, including Sofia Koller of the Counter Extremism Project, suggest that the Syrian transfer of camp administration could enable European States, including Finland, to repatriate nationals, allowing for legal processing, risk assessment, and structured rehabilitation. Prior European returns indicate that reintegration can be cautiously successful, and major terrorist threats have not materialized despite initial concerns. (Source)
13/02/2026: The Finnish Financial Intelligence Unit has published the 2025 Annual Report. Throughout 2025, the Unit has received 249 reports concerning or indicating terrorist financing. From the reports received during the year, 73 separate intelligence investigations related to terrorist financing were opened, leading to 105 disclosures of information to various authorities. The Financial Intelligence Unit has engaged in continuous cooperation with both domestic and international actors by monitoring and analyzing the impact of various phenomena on terrorist financing. In 2025, cooperation with other authorities and international partners was particularly pivotal in understanding and combating current trends. The growing use of digital platforms, hybrid influence, and the radicalization of minors were noted as further rising factors to be taken into account in countering terrorist financing. As in previous years, the largest intelligence investigations related to terrorist financing involved cases where individuals residing in Finland were suspected of collecting and transferring funds to terrorist organizations operating abroad.
In 2025, terrorism-related intelligence investigations highlighted funds channeled through the personal accounts of Finnish private individuals, the origin of which was, in most cases, donation proceeds received from crowdfunding platforms. In the vast majority of these cases, the fundraising was carried out via digital crowdfunding platforms, and transfers were facilitated primarily through payment service providers instead of traditional bank transfers. In connection with these cases, indications were also observed that individuals residing in Finland had opened fundraisers and user accounts in their own names on various platforms, while the actual users of these accounts were located outside of Finland. The majority of such fundraisers were opened for charitable purposes, but some showed indications of supporting terrorist organizations. The development of international conflicts significantly affected activities related to terrorist financing, and ideologically motivated fundraisers in particular gained increased attention. The potential for hybrid influence by State actors was also taken into account in intelligence investigations focusing on combating terrorist financing. No significant changes were observed in the financing capacity of religiously motivated extremist organizations compared to the previous year. Reports related to terrorist financing in 2025 continued to highlight the use of hawala operators and cryptocurrencies in fund transfers to third countries. The Financial Intelligence Unit also continued its active monitoring of phenomena related to the Far Right and the investigation of potential links to criminal activity. This investigative work was carried out in close cooperation with various units of the National Bureau of Investigation. (Source)
01/03/2026: Following the airstrikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran carried out by Israel and the United States of America on February 28, 2026 that resulted in the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei with risks of further escalation, Supo Communications Manager, Milla Meretniemi, stated that the terrorist threat assessment in Finland remains unchanged. However, considering that events in the Middle East have an impact on Islamist movements in Europe, cautiousness and preparedness against potential subversive and terrorist threats are required. (Source)
10/03/2026: Finnish Supo published the 2026 National Terrorism Threat Assessment for Finland that classifies the national terrorism threat level as elevated (level three out of five) and emphasizes that the Finnish threat environment is largely shaped by international developments. The most likely perpetrators of attacks are individuals or small autonomous groups, primarily inspired by Islamism or Far-Right ideologies, with attacks in other Western countries potentially inspiring similar acts domestically.
The report identifies Islamist terrorism as the most significant threat in Europe. Since the Hamas attacks of October 2023 and the subsequent war in Gaza, Jihadist organizations such as IS and Al-Qaeda have intensified propaganda efforts encouraging attacks in Western countries. Although counterterrorism measures have limited their operational capacity, these organizations continue to seek influence by inspiring self-radicalized individuals or small cells, which are the most common actors behind attack plots. The most likely forms of violence remain low-tech attacks against civilians, such as stabbings or vehicle attacks.
The assessment also notes the presence of State-linked terrorist activities associated with Iran in Europe. Several countries have recorded attacks or plots targeting Jewish or Israeli-linked targets and opponents of the Iranian regime, often carried out through criminal networks acting as proxies. While no such incidents have occurred in Finland so far, similar operations cannot be ruled out.
The report assesses Far-Right terrorism as a secondary threat compared to Islamist terrorism. It is primarily driven by online networks promoting accelerationism and glorifying past attacks, particularly Christchurch and Utøya. Most incidents involve self-radicalized individuals or small groups, often young or minors, who typically use simple weapons and target perceived ideological opponents such as minorities or political figures. Organized Far-Right movements are not seen as direct terrorist actors but can facilitate radicalization and legitimize violence.
A major concern highlighted in the assessment is the growing radicalization of young people and minors, particularly in online environments. Vulnerable youth increasingly participate in extremist communities that normalize violence and reinforce ideological commitment. This trend affects supporters of both Jihadist and Far-Right ideologies, but it also intersects with a broader culture of online nihilistic violence. Digital networks such as The Com and 764 encourage extreme acts including suicide, sexual violence, and brutality, often involving minors as both perpetrators and victims. These communities can overlap ideologically with extremist movements, particularly Far-Right accelerationism, and have been classified as terrorist organizations in some Western countries. (Source)
03/04/2026: A minor boy previously detained in the al-Hol camp was repatriated to Finland from Iraq. He was taken to Syria in the mid-2010 and was held in the camp since 2019 until his transfer by the United States from Northeastern Syria to Iraq alongside 5700 men following the regional takeover by Damas’ forces in February 2026. On March 31, 2026, an Iraqi court decided to release him and hand him over to the Finnish Embassy in Baghdad for repatriation. The boy reportedly has Finnish citizenship only and does not represent any threat to Finland security according to Consul Jussi Tanner. Moreover, the decision to repatriate him was taken in compliance with the obligations of the Constitution and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, Finnish Supo kept warning since 2019 in their annual reports that returnees from Syria may pose a security threat on the very long term, not necessarily in terms of terrorist attacks but mostly in terms of propaganda and recruitment efforts or radicalization. Finland stands as a specific case among European countries as none of the returnees who previously joined IS throughout the 2010’s faced charges upon their return. Finnish authorities are expected to draft and announce a new legislation in counterterrorism matters that is supposed to rectify this flaw. (Source)
28/05/2026: Finnish Ministry of Finance and the Financial Intelligence Unit of the National Bureau of Investigation have designed the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2026 which constitutes Finland’s fourth national assessment of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing risks. The report supplements the national risk assessments issued in 2021 and 2023 and provides a comprehensive analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences affecting eighteen reporting sectors of the Finnish economy. It also introduces an updated national action plan for the period 2026–2029 aimed at mitigating identified risks.
The report concludes that Finland faces a significant national money laundering risk (level 3 on a four-point scale) and a moderately significant terrorist financing risk (level 2). These risk levels stem primarily from cross-border criminal financial flows, the use of both registered and unregistered hawala-type money transfer systems, broader underground banking networks, the increasing use of crypto-assets and digital financial services, and persistent weaknesses in information sharing, expertise, and institutional resources.
Several major money laundering threats are identified. These include the use of nominee arrangements, the abuse of legal entities, organized criminal groups and street gangs, and professional facilitators who assist criminal enterprises. Criminal organizations increasingly exploit corporate structures to conceal ownership, conduct fraud, evade taxes, launder proceeds, and transfer assets abroad. Fraud-related offences, particularly cyber-enabled fraud, payment instrument fraud, and identity theft, constitute the most important predicate offences for money laundering. Drug trafficking, economic crime, and cybercrime are also highlighted as growing sources of illicit proceeds.
Concerning Islamist terrorism and its financing, the Finnish National Risk Assessment concludes that Islamist activity in Finland is primarily directed toward supporting international terrorist movements rather than conducting domestic operations. According to Supo, such activities mainly involve the production and dissemination of propaganda, fundraising, and the expansion of support networks. Nevertheless, international developments have elevated the threat level in recent years. The report notes that the expansion of conflicts in the Middle East, controversies surrounding Quran burnings in Europe, and instability following the rise of HTS in Syria have contributed to radicalization and mobilization processes. It further identifies IS and Al-Qaeda, together with their affiliated networks, as the principal Jihadist threats to Europe and Finland. The most likely attack scenario in Finland remains that of a lone actor or small group inspired by Jihadist propaganda and previous attacks abroad.
The assessment emphasizes that Islamist networks operating in or through Finland generally channel resources toward activities abroad. Donations constitute a major source of funding, while the principal transfer methods include cryptocurrencies, cash, registered and unregistered hawala networks, bank transfers, neobanks, and online crowdfunding platforms. The report highlights several vulnerabilities, including anonymous crowdfunding services, the exploitation of NPOs, and the fragmentation of transfers into numerous small transactions that are difficult to detect. Europol's findings cited in the report indicate that many Jihadist-related arrests in the European Union during 2024 involved fundraising efforts for IS or other terrorist organizations active in conflict zones. The assessment therefore portrays Islamist terrorist financing as a highly transnational phenomenon characterized by small-value transfers, digital fundraising, and reliance on informal financial networks that complicate detection and supervision. (Source)
29/05/2026: Finnish Ministry of Justice declared that President of the Republic Alexander Stubb confirmed the legal amendments to revise Terrorism legislation. As such, Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code on terrorist offences will be replaced by a new Chapter 34a on terrorist offences. This is a comprehensive reform, in which the chapter has been revised based on an extensive assessment of the need for change. However, the basis for the new regulation is in the previous regulation. Henceforth, the penalties for terrorist crimes will be harsher. The scope of criminal liability for these crimes will also be expanded. The key changes to terrorism legislation include: It will be punishable for a person to stay in a country of which they are not a citizen or in which they do not permanently reside, in order to commit a terrorist offence there. The provision specifically combats the phenomenon of terrorist foreign fighters. Criminal liability may also apply to a family member of a person working in a terrorist organisation; Aggravated deprivation of liberty, aggravated rape, aggravated robbery and aggravated rape of a child will be added to the list of offences committed with terrorist intent; Handling objects or substances that, in connection with the commission of a terrorist offence, may cause serious danger to the life or health of another person will be punishable as preparation for a terrorist offence; It will be punishable for a person to travel to another country for the purpose of promoting terrorist travel or to attempt to provide terrorist training; It will be punishable more broadly than at present for a person to promote a terrorist offence committed by another person through their actions. The crimes promoted no longer need to be identified with the current level of precision, which will significantly enhance the fight against terrorist crimes; More severe penalties than currently available may be imposed, for example, for preparing a terrorist crime, terrorist training, and terrorist travel and promotion of travel. The new legislation will enter into force on June 1, 2026. (Source)
09/06/2026: A North Caucasian man named Ruslan Meyriev living in the Helsinki metropolitan area, was sentenced in Antwerp, Belgium, to twelve years in prison for terrorist activities related to ISKP, the Central Asian wing of IS, along with six other convicts. He was found guilty by the Court of leading an ISKP cell from Finland that planned bomb attacks and financed terrorism. He fled to Ukraine in 2012 as he was wanted by Russian authorities and ultimately headed to Finland in August 2023 after the war where he was granted asylum on the grounds that his life would be at stake in Russia. He was also suspected of terrorism in Ukraine, but no charges were filed in that case. Although Finnish authorities denied that he was a threat, Belgium issued an international arrest warrant for activities related to terrorism with a man residing in Belgium. According to the Court, Meyriev sent instruction to agents in Belgium from a shopping mall in Finland and his group raised money to release captured IS fighters. Meyriev was arrested by Swedish authorities in August 2024 when he went to Sweden and got extradited to Belgium where he remained imprisoned for almost two years. (Source)
In reaction to the Antwerp Court’s verdict, Supo’s Head of Counter-Terrorism, Risto Värtö, expressed satisfaction on June 11, 2026 with the outcome of the trial and highlighted the Finnish contribution to the investigation, which had "paid off". In cooperation with the Finnish Central Criminal Police (KRP) and in support of the Belgian authorities, Supo monitored Meyriev’s activities in what Värtö described as "the largest operation undertaken by Supo in recent years". This operation formed part of Finland’s renewed efforts to counter IS-related terrorist activities conducted from Finnish territory and targeting neighbouring countries. Supo further emphasized that this trend is increasingly reflected in the activation of independent Russian-speaking networks across Europe and its neighbouring regions. However, Värtö stressed that this development does not alter Finland’s current terrorist threat assessment, as the actions of Finnish authorities have contributed to disrupting the network. (Source)
The other convicted persons received prison sentences of five to fifteen years. Meyriev denied the charges. His case is related to the arrests made by the KRP in Helsinki and Vantaa in September 2024. Three men were were arrested under suspicion of participating in terrorist activities from Helsinki between January 1, 2023 and June 10, 2024. However they were released within a few days and their preliminary investigations concerning a total of five suspects are still ongoing. According to Mikko Salminen, the head of the investigation at KRP, the preliminary investigations in Finland have progressed but are not complete yet, and all are related to the suspects' ties with Meyriev's cell. (Source)
Finnish media Helsingin Sanomat met with those suspects in Mellunmäki, Helsinki. At least some of them acknowledge they have been in contact with Meyriev, but they deny committing any crimes. Supo has assessed that the presence of a dozen individuals from North Caucasus in the country, including those targeted by the preliminary investigations, could pose a threat to national security and four have received decisions from the Finnish Immigration Service revoking their refugee status and residence permits. However, none have been deported from Finland and are still living freely in the country. In most cases, deportation has been prevented due to the imposition of return bans. (Source)